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Chapter 13
-Using Systematic Thinking
to Choose and Evaluate Evidence
Robert J. Griffin

Robert J. Griffin is the director of the Center for Mass Media Research al
Marque/le University, where he is a professor ofjournalism in the College of
Communication and winner of the university 's premier award for sustained
teaching e.xcellence. He has authored or coauthored articles and chapters on
reporting about science, environment, and energy; he is lead editor of the book
lnterpreting Public Jssues. His recent research focuses on risk communication
and methods of leaching statistical reasoning to journalism students.

"God does not play dice with the universe. "

-Albert Einstein, c. 20th century
"How can 1 be su re, in a world that 's constantly changing?"

-The Rascals. c. 20th century
"Be sure of it; give me the ocular proof . .. No hinge nor loop
to hang a doubt on. "

-W11ham Shakespeare (Othello III, 3), c. 16th century

Uncertainty will always plague us. You can bet on that. For a joumalist,
dealing with uncertainty is part of the job. Sometimes we feel uncertain
because we sense that we lack enough k.nowledge of something we could
know more about. Sometimes we feel uncertain because we cannot predict
the seeming vagaries ofreal causal forces in the world as they influence card
games, football games, volcanic eruptions, elections, human health, and
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other aspects of our surroundings ranging from the microscopic· to the cosmic
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). ln either case, a journalist's audience usually
wants at least enough ceitainty in the inforn1ation they are given so that they
can deal with their world with sorne confidence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 ).
Of course, if the audience's world ís in fact uncertain, a good journalist
accurately points that out. For exaniple, the results ofpreelection political polls
and other sample surveys of the pubhc are couched in sampling error. A
joumalist who reports such a survey accurately and responsibly will always
take into account the survey's margin of error_ when interpreting the poli for the
audience. Similar! y, health risk estirnates are often posed as a range of probabilities that indicate a person's chance of being victimized by a given injury
or illness. F or exarnple, the local health department m ight proclaim that a person
who is not vaccinated might ha ve a 1 in 100 to 1 in 500 ehan ce of catching the
la test strain of flu.
Due to the nature of scientific inquiry, there is always sorne degree of
uncertainty in scientific findings. In fact, the scientist lives in a world in which
absolute proof is virtually impossible. Yet, based on the fruits of scientific
inquiry, govemment officials often have to make decisions affecting public
policies, includiilg controversia! actions such as limiting the emissi.ons of
greenhouse gases or requiring that additives be put into gasoline in certain cities
to reduce urbana ir pollution. Judges and juries often ha veto determine, based
on scientific evidence, whether plaintiffs have been hanned by hazards such as
workplace carcinogens, defective products, or medica! malpractice. At best,
these decisions are made only after carefully weighing the bulk and quality of
scientífic findings that bear, pro and con, on the policy or judgment.

CONFIDENCE GAMES

E ven careful decisions can be corrupted by those who have a stake in misrepresenting scientific certainty. Basically, there are at least two kinds of practitioners of these scientific "confidence games": those who present scientific
results as being more certain than the findings warrant and those who want to
dismíss even strong scientific findings because the results are less than absolutely certain.
The fonner can include sorne scientists who have a professional stake in
presenting findings that are noteworthy and sorne of the people who allege that
they ha ve beeil victimized by tecbnology, products, or malpractice. The latter
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can include sorne industry representatives whose job is to cast doubt on
scientific revelations about deleterious effects of products, mectical practices,
or manufacturing processes. These two sides often collide in the courts, wher_e
judges have been given more and more discretion to act as what ·the U.S.
Supreme Court terms gatekeepers of scientific evidence. For example, judges
in product liability cases can exclude expert testimony if "there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered," according to
Chief Justice William Rehnquist (Biskupic, 1997, p. A2). As members of the
fourth estate, joumalists will continue to have a responsibility to help ensure
that governmental and judicial decisions are balanced and based on valid
scientific evidence and principies.
Of course, everyday people also have to make decisions based in part on
scientific findings. These decisions can include which products to purchase,
which scientific, technical, or environmental policies to support as cit:izens, and
which changes in Iifestyles or habits might affect their personal health and
safety. Confidence hucksters can muddy those choices as well. So, it is also part
ofa reporter'sjob to help audiences sort empirical fact fromjunk science when
people consider various consumer, political, and health-related options. In fact,
people tend to rely a lot on the mass media as sources of information about
health risks in particular (Freimuth, Edgar, & Hammond, 1987; Singer &
Endreny, 1987).
One ofthe best ways for ajournalist to discover whether scientific-sounding
claims are valid is to subject them to the rigors of systematic thinking, that is,
to the rules of evidence and reasoning scientists routinely apply to their
investigations. Systematic think.ing does not require journa1ists to be experts in
research methodology and mathematics, although sorne basic knowledge of
scientific procedures and statistics is certainly helpful (see, e.g., Cohn, 1989;
Meyer, 1991). In fact, contrary to what many may believe,journalists are not
inherently math dummies. Fresbman college students going intojournalism are
justas adept at math as the average college freshman (Becker & Graf, 1994).
"lt is time to let the secret out," as Paulos (1995) wrote in his book, A
Mathematician Reads the Newspaper. "Mathematics is not primarily a matter
of plugging numbers into formulas and performing rote computations. It is a
way of thinking and questioning that m ay be unfamiliar to many of us, but is
available to almost all of us" (p. 3 ).
So, mostjouma]ists should be ab1e to handle the kinds ofreasoningprocesses
required to think systematically about the news and, because science and
statistics underlie many news stories, they have an increasing responsibility to
their aud.iences to do so. However, one of the most common practices of the
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joumalistic craft-relying on anecdotal infonnation in gathering and presenting
the news-can markedly interfere with a reporter's attempts toapply systematic
thinking.

THE STORYTELLERS
Basically; the journalist's job is to tell a story. So it is quite natural for a
journalist to think in terms of anecdotes to present the news. If there is a new
treatment for diabetes, interview a few diabetics and fmd out ho~ that will make
life easier for them. If the state health department warns people about health
dangers from eating fish that might contain mercury or PCBs, tap sorne anglers
on the shoulder and ask them if they are worried. If a new study shows that TV
viewing influences the academic performance ofpreteens, ask sorne local grade
school teachers what they have noticed. If a federal report shows that urbanization is seriously encroaching on land used to grow food, write a story that
follows a fann family through years of economic struggles.
The common .wisdom among joumalists is that anecdotes d.raw audience
interest, humanize a news story and, because anecdotes tend to be vivid, mak.e
the news memorable. Unfortunately, relatively little is known about the actual
effects these techniques have on audiences. What is known suggests that
joumalists should exercise sorne caution when employing anecdotal information in stories so as not to mislead audiences or themselves.

Certain Examples, Uncertain Evidence
Anecdotes can be fine examples, but they are usually poor evidence, especially
in the news. It is easy for a reporter to assume that the grassroots quotes she
just gleaned from a dozen motorists at the local filling station were notjust great
copy for her story about gasoline taxes but typify a cross section of public
opinion as well. Toa social scientist, those same interviews are a convenience
survey of an unrepresentative sample of 12. In other situations, a reporter might
find an example of a prominent local athlete who is struggling to overcome
drug dependence to ilJustrate bis story on addiction in the cíty. To a social
scientist, the athlete is strikingly atypical ofthe problems everyday people face.
Problems multiply when journalists present anecdotal information directly
as evidence. For example, Newsweek ran an article headline<L "Conspiracy
mania feeds our growíng national paranoia, (Marin & Gegax, 1996-1997, p.
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64). Claiming that "conspiracy paranoia is surrounding us," the article takes a brief
yet critica! tour of sorne popular conspiracy theories. The news peg, as reflected in
the headline, is that popular belief in conspi.racies is growing. "This great nation
has always bad its share of conspiracy freaks .... But the ranks of the darkly deluded
may be growing," the authors stated (p. 66). "Ciearly, something is heating up in
the more tropical clímes of the American psyche/' Marin and Gegax concluded,
based primarily on the following evidence cited in the article:

• Three quarters of Americans believed that the government is somehow
involved in conspiracy, according toa survey reported in George magazine.
• America Online had begun a channel for fans of the paranormal and the
paranoid.
• Mel Gibson starred in a movie called Conspiracy Theory.
• The editor ofThe Skeptical Inquirer, a publication that debunks the farout,
said that there certainly seems to be a resurgence in sympathy toward
conspiracy theory and an increase in paranoia.
Most ofthe evidence is anecdotal and non e of it would support the conclusion
that, nationally, paranoia and belief in conspiracies are growing. That conclu~
sion requires evidence that compares representative surveys of Americans at
two points in time and asks about their beliefs in a variety of conspiracies. Such
evidence might balance the anecdotal infonnation presented in the story and
relegate it to what it is: example instead of evidence.
Reliance on anecdotes might affect audiences in other ways as well. W ith
our minds and our worlds filled with uncertaínties and our days filled with only
24 hours, we often fall back on judgmental shortcuts, called heuristics, to make
sense of things (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Heuristics are intuitive and can
often bias our judgments. For example, people might overestimate the risks of
cancer in the population if someone they k.now has the disease. Reading about
a cancer case in the news will probably not have quite the effect on a person's
judgment as would ftrSthand knowledge. Nonetheless, vivid anecdotes, which
are a news staple, could influence a person'sjudgments ofrisks and should be
employed carefully by joumalists.

SYSTEMATIC THINKING ANO UNCERTAINTY
The use of anecdotes by joumalists is certainly not goíng to disappear, but it is
important to ~ather and present anecdotal information as examples rather than
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evidence, to find typical examples instead of extreme cases to illustrate a story,
and to coucb descriptíon within a context that sbows how representative or
unrepresentative the cases may be. In most situatíons, th.is requires the systematic gathering of representative data of sorne type. However, just because
ínformatíon is in numerical form does not mean that it is necessarily any more
representative than a typical verbal anecdote. In fact, undígested statistical
information is often nothing more than a quantitative anecdote.
Although we will probably never overcome all of our uncertainty about the
world, the techniques of systematic thinking employed by scientists serve to
reduce the uncertainty that is brought about by faulty reason~g and improper
evidence. The next sections illustrate three steps to systematic thinking that
journalists can employ in their daily work.

As Compared to What?
Joumalists often encounter raw statistics, sucb as the number ofpeople afflicted
by heart disease or involved in automobile crashes annually. Sorne ofthese raw
numbers can be quite astounding and equally misleading. For example, in 1992,
The New York Times reported that four of America's largest cities-Los
Angeles, San Diego, Dalias, and Phoenix---each tallied a record number of
killings the previous year. As Arnold Bamett (1994) observed in Technology
Review:
The irnplication was that even one all-time high among such cities was un usual,
Jet alone four. The report failed to point out, however, that all four ofthese cities
al so reached new highs in population in 1991 ; th us, even iftheír per cap ita murder
rates had not changed since Cain slew Abel, their absolute 1991 murder tolls
would. ha ve set new records. (p. 44)

First Step: Find the Baseline
Indeed, the frrst step in systematic thinking is to establish an appropriate
baseline. A common means of establishing a baseline is totuma raw statistic
into arate (e.g., 1 out ofevery 1,000) or percentage (e.g., .1%) by using an
appropriate denominator. If The New York Times had used one of these
techniques to establish a baseline, a different picture of urban murders might
indeed ha ve emerged. Thus, baselines provide essential interpretive context for
any raw statistic.

13. USING SYSTEMATIC THINKING

231

Baselines also give context to an anecdote, especially by helping audiences
see how representative the case is. For example, in a feature on the growíng
proportion of senior citizens who resort to suicide, Milwaulcee Journal Sentinel
reporter Fran Bauer ( 1996) started the story with this brief account:
Recently, an elderly man parked his car, wa1ked to the top of the High Rise
Bridge, stepped over the guard rails and jumped to his death.
Divers tried franrica\ly to rescue the man from the icy waters ofthe Milwaukee
River below. But he died within minutes, a suicíde.
For most, the case was quickly forgotten.
Yet staristics tell a far grimmer story. (p. G 1)

Bauer then gave readers context for the anecdote by including national data on the
disproportionate upturn of suicides among older citizens, especially males, from
1980 to 1992 and showing that, although persons aged 65 and older accounted for
only 13% of the population, they made up nearly 20o/o of all suicides. In doing so,
the reporter made ít clear that the proportion of suicides in the older.age group is
notjust a simple reflection oftheir numbers in the population. The rest ofthe article
discussed the factors such as isolat:ion, depression, changing cultural attitudes, and
even longevity ítself that might contribute to suicides among the aging.
To help bring this message home, the paper accompanied the story with a
graphic titled "1994 Suicides by Age Group in Milwaukee County'' (Fig. 13.1 ).
Unfortunately, however, that graphic confused the picture the reporter had so
carefully presented in text. At first glance, the pie chart seems to show that
suicides are decimating the young but are rare among the old. What caused this
pie chart to go sour? Instead of depicting suicides in each age group on a per
capita basis, as would be appropriate for the story, the chart shows the portian
of the total nu.mber of suicides that occurred in each age group. In short, the
graphic confuses the meaning of the story because it ignores the baseline,
speci fically, the size of eaeh age group in the local popuJation. To better illustrate
Bauer's trend story, the newspaper might have used a couple of charts-one
portraying per capita suicides in each age group in 1994 and another showíng
the same break.down for 1980. That way, two essential baselines are used: the
population base and the prevalen ce of suicides ata comparative time in the past.

Second Step: Make a Dynamic Comparison
Despite its flawed graphic, the suicide article showed how comparing rates
across groups and across time can reveal dynamic pattems that are otherwise
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.1994 suicides
by age group in
Milwaukee County

.......__TOTAL
50 and older

32.5%
Source: Milwaukee County
Medie<!! E.xaminer's office

JOUI'J'\é!l Sentinel

FIG. 13.1. 1994 Suicides by age group in Milwaukee County.

obscured when reporters employ only simple descriptions in the form of
anecdotes, raw statistics, ore ven raw rates and percentages (e.g., reporti.ng only
the overall suicide rate for the population in general). A phenomenon such as
illness or suicide now becomes a variable to be compared with another variable,
such as age or sex differences, giving clues to sometimes subtle forces at work
in sociecy and in human lives. Of course, as Cohn ( 1989) noted, these comparisons can take many forms and must be rigorous and fair. However, looking for
these dynamic comparisons is the second step in systematic thinkíng. By
habítually ask.ing "as compared to what?" and searching carefully for solíd
evidence ofthe answer, joumalists can get new insights into the news and avoid
sorne flimsy or misleading conclusions.
F or example, Disco ver magazine once reported that 90% of the people who
survived airplane crashes had formed in their minds a plan of escape before the
accident happened (N olan, 1986). Their recommendation? Look for the emergency
exits and plan how to get off before you take off. This advice seems sensible
enough., but it is not as factually based as it would seem. Note that Discover's
advice is based on a comparison that is impüed but for which there is no evidence.
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As Gilovich (1997) observed, it ís impossible to find out what percentage of
the nonsurvivors had also formulated escape plans. In short, there is no way of
knowing whether those who planned their way out actually fared any better. _
In another case, an Associated Press (1995) article about the success of
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) appeared under the headline: "Bystanders' CPR Efforts Often Backfire, Study Says. '' The lead paragraph read:
"Chicago-Bystanders who attempted CPR on cardiac arrest victims got it
wrong more than half the time, reducing patients' already slirn chances of
survival, a study found" (p. 6A).
Notice that the clear implication of the newspaper headline and of the fust
paragrnph is that peop1e who try todo CPR on a heart attack victim, but who
do it improperly, are doing more hann to the victim than if they had done
nothing at all . That is pretty important advice, advice with ethical and legal
implications, a~ well as with implications for the life of the poor victim.
The news item was based on an article by Gallagher, Lombardi, and Gennis
(1995) that appeared in the Journal of the American Medica/ Association
(JAMA). The brief Associated Press news story quotes one of the article's
authors, John Gallagher of the Albert Einstein College of Medícine in New
York, as stating that improperly administered CPR "does not seem to be any
better than no c ·P R." He did not say that improperly administered CPR is worse
than no CPR, which should have tipped off the reporter that something was
arniss in the lead paragraph.
An abstract of the JAMA article, then readily available to joumalists wíth
Internet access, briefly explained the research method and basic fmdings of the
study. Emergen e y hospital personnel, who anived at the scene of a cardiac arrest,
recorded ·whether any bystanders had attempted CPR on the victim and, if so,
whether the technique they used was effective, that is, whether it was performed
according to medica! guidelines. The patient survíved if he or she was able to
retum home from the hospital. The researchers also controlled for sorne other
factors that might affect the outcome ofthe study. The abstract explained that:
the survival statistíc for those receiving CPR was 19 out of 662 compared to 1 t
out of 1405 who did not receive CPR .... Ofthose patients who received effective
bystanderCPR, 14 out of305 survived (4.6%) compared with 5 out of357 (1.4%)
who received CPRjudged to be ineffective.
A careful reading of the numbers shows that only 0.8% (11/1,405) of the
victims who received no CPR had survived. In situatíons like this, a simple but
systematic jotting down of the numbers on a notepad, su eh as a reporter might
ha ve done in .Fig. 13.2, can help jou.rnalists-and their audiences-understand
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N&CPR

I~t.Ne/CPR

E{fed:'vve- CPR.

o.B%~w~

1.lf%~ÍN~

lf. 6% l«<"Vi»e.d,

FIG. 13.2. JAMA number comparisons.

what comparisons are being made. Although giving ineffective CPR might
not real! y improve the victim 's odds of surviva] as compared to administering
no CPR at all, it certainly does not "backfire" by "reducing patients' already
slim chances of survival," as the story headline and lead had erroneously
reported.
Perhaps the statistics most in need of dynamic comparisons and reportorial
finesse are vital statistics data representing health and disease, life and death.
"They are much applied, misused, and misunderstood," stated Cohn (1989, p.
74). "Yet these statistics can yield fascinating stories ifwe learn something of
their power and limits and the rather special vocabulary of human Iives:'
Cautioning that disease data are often applied too broadly to the population,
Crossen ( 1996) observed:
One in five American men witl get prostate cancer. One in eight American
women will get breast cancer. At least two mi Ilion Arnericans are manic-depressíve, and more than two mili ion are schízophreníc. At least 60 million Americans
have high blood pressure, 12 mi Ilion have asthma and four mí Ilion have Alzheimer's disease. One in three Americans is obese.
With numbers like these, it is ama.i:ing there is anyone still here--let alone people
living happy, healthy llves. Projections ofthe incidence of disease are rampant
these days, as a growing number ofhealth advocacy groups compete for people' s
limited attentíon and money. Most of the numbers are extrapolations or estimates:_at best. Yet as the media report thern, often uncritically and without
context, these conjectures assume the mantle of quantifiable fact. (p. B 1)

Crossen suggested that a better way to present information to people about
risks of a disease is to project, for example, how risks vary by gender and age.
Figure 13.3 illustrates data her story provided on the probability of developing
cancer in 1O, 20, and 30 years, and eventually formen and women of various
ages who are currently free of cancer. The chart shows sorne very interesting
pattems. For women, for example, the overall risk of getting cancer sometime
in life actually decreases as they get older. The same is not true formen. Of
course, heart and circulatory problems claim more human lives than does
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FIG. 13.3. Based on data from The Wall Street Journa/.

cancer, Crossen said, and people should remember that, despite increasing
longevity, no one lives forever.
Figure 13.3 is an example of what statisticians call a multívariate ana/ysis.
Tables such as these are very useful beca use they illustrate the ways different
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factors (here, age and sex) might combine in different ways to produce different
outcomes (here, the risk of cancer). Notice that this is a much more dynamic
and realistic picture of the way life really is than one gets from the more
crude descriptions provided by simple anecdotes and undigested statistics.
However, because data such as these can become quite complicated for
people to understand, journalists will need to become more adept at
reasoning from data and interpreting data for audiences. Innova ti ve and
clear graphic displays of statistical information ( e.g., Tufte, 1983, 1997;
Utts, 1996; Wainer, 1997) are essential to t~at task. In particular, computers and other new technologies offer exciting opportunities to use hypertext (Fredin, 19~7), animation, and interactive environments to help
people understand data dynamics·.

Error and Uncertainty
Journalists also should remernber that even the most carefully gathered
statistical information contains sorne uncertainty in the form of error. Sorne
ofthe error rests in the techniques and measures used to gather the information, such as relying on the completeness of health department records, the
precision of a medical test, ora person's ability or willingness to report
illnesses, socially undesirable activities, or highly personal information to
a survey interviewer. Sorne ofthe error rests ín extrapolating or generalizing
from, for example, animal tests to humans or from a sample to the population. So, in making dynamic comparisons, it is important to take into account
what the range of error might be. As a general rule, we should be cautious
about small differences between groups, especially if the differences are
only a few percentage points. They might simply be the result of error and,
therefore, have no real meaning. If the data are from a well-designed
probability sample survey (of people in a city, for example) or laboratory
experiment in which subjects were randomly assigned to conditions (a
placebo versus a new drug, for example), then a reporter can more readily
get a handle on how much room to a11ow for error by relying on the reported
statistical significance of the results or by applying the standard formula to
determine the margin of error in surveys. Of course, even these statistical
tests will not compensate for errors in the measures and techniques themselves, so it is still wise to exercise sorne caution.
So, a good revision of the question posed at the beginning of this section is
this: "As compared to what, given error?"

13. USING SYSTEMATIC THINKING
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SIDEBAR:
EXAMPLES ANO SAMPLES, OR
HOW A LITTLE HOMEWORK CAN GO A LONG W A Y .
Parents from th~ Milwaukee suburb of Sborewood bad complained t.bat their
seventh-grade offspring were being given an unusual amount ofhomework, so
much so that their backpacks were becoming laden with books and too beavy
for a kid to carry.
So, to check out these parental allegations, reporters decided to compare the
heaviness of the backpacks of Shorewood Intermedia te School students to the
weight of back:packs carried by their peers at two schools in neighboring
communities. In a large, color graphic that accompanied the front-page article
("Full Load," 1997), the paper listed the weight of ea eh of the 14 backpacks
sampled at eacb of the three schools a long with the average backpack weight
at each school: 20.43 pounds atShorewood, 16.93 pounds at University School,
and 11.93 pounds at Morse Middle School. The data are reproduced in Figure
13 .4. The reporters concluded that "for the most part, the [Shorewo.od] parents
were right." To further illustrate the point, the newspaper used an example as
part of the. graphic: a photo of a student from the Shorewood school whose
backpack was heavier (at 31 pounds) than any ofthe other backpacks from any
of the schools. "What's it like carrying around 31 pounds?" asked a tag line
above the student's photo. The answer, also illustrated, is that 31 pounds is
equal to the weight ofnearly two bowling balls or 191 toy "beanie babies" and
is greater than the weight of a Trek 750 bicycle. The story itself is peppered
with quotes from students at the three schoo1s about what it is like to lug their
burdens.
All in all, the reporters endeavored to conduct a dynamic comparison across
three schools and tried to use comparative data on the average weight of
backpacks at each institution to provide a moderating context for the quotations
from students. Without the weigh-ins, the entire story might have had to rely
on the use of anecdotes as evidence instead of as examples. The interesting
graphic tried to translate the weight ofbackpacks into tenns many readers rnight
understand.
Unfortunately, two enduringjoumalistic problems-using unrepresentative
examples and unrepresentative samples-seemed to mar this otherwise laudable effort:
l. The illustration used the decidedly atypical backpack-the one that
weighed more than any of the others and half again as m ueh as the average for
Shorewood Intermediate School-rather than a typical backpack (the mean,
(continued)
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Sidebar (continued)

lt's tough being a backer ptdcer
!t all began when sorne Shorewood parents complained how heavy their kids'
backpacks have become bec.au.se of the amount of hOITie\NOrl< brought home.
Do their concems carry ~ight? We found out. by weighing backpad:s from 14
students from each of the schoo!s below. The results? Well, for the rnost: part the
parents vvere righl And how do the kids feel about carrying all that \1\/eight?
Sorne shrugged it off, but others said it feels like the -Neight of the wond.
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FIG. 13.4.

median and mode are 20 pounds) to represent that scbool. Joumalists too often
use the atypical as an example, C)nd in this case the reader can too easily be
confused about the average weight ofbackpacks at that school.
2. Tbe reporters used wbat they described in the text of the story as a "very
unscientific survey, (p. 1A) to choose which backpacks to weigh. Although
tbey did not describe how they selected backpacks, "unscientific" usualJy
means "nonrandom sample, and opens tbe possíbility that expectations about
fi.nding heavier backpacks at tbe Shorewood scbool might have unconsciously
affected reporters' choices. A random sample of sorne type would probably not
bave been too hard to conduct, especialJy given the effort reporters had already
devoted to the story. And it would have given the reporters a big advantage:
they would have hada means to control for sampling error. As it ís, there is no
way to reduce the Iarge amount of uncertainty in their results. In short, it ís not
clear what they actually found. In fact, had the same data been the result of a
random sample, the results would show that the average backpack weíght at
Shorewood Intermediate School is not different, beyond samplíng error, from
the average backpack weights at University School, according toa statistical
(con tinued)
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Sidebar (continued)
test called the "analysis ofvariance" commonly available on desktop computer
statistical packages. The real fmding would be that Morse Middle School
backpacks are the lightest and that, for the most part, the Shorewood parents
were wrong.

WHY ANO SO WHAT?
Interpretation is an essential component of good reporting and usually requires
answering the questíons "why?" and "so what?" The answer to the question
"why?"-for example, "Why does urban sprawl affect water quality?'' or "Why
would eating fatty foods increase a person 's risk ofheart attack?"--calls on the
reporter to address cause-and-effect relation·s. Similarly, the answer to the
question "so, what? .. -for example, "So, whatpolícy solutions can mitigate the
effects of sprawl on water qualíty?" or "So, what personal actions can one take
to lower the risk of a heart attack?"-also requires analysis of causality.
Because people tend to base their preferences for solutions toa problem on
their perceptions of what caused the problem (Diclier, 1987), it is important for
reporters to present causal information carefully to audiences. Doing so means
being especially alert to sorne ofthe common mistakes we aJI make in everyday
causal reasoning. Many of these miscues stem from the need to quickly
overcome uncertainties in our world in order to go about everyday Ji fe pressures
that certainly affect reporters at least as muchas everyone else. For a reporter,
however, taking a more careful and responsible approach to interpreting causality requires taking a more systematic look at what causes wha4 adopting in
less fonnal ways the standards of proof scientists require.

Third Step: Use Causal Caution
Dynamic comparisons reveal what are commonly known as correlations between variables. ln the sciences, establishing a correlation between two variables is an essential step in determining whether one may be a cause of the
other. Suppose tbere were no correlation between being a cigarette smoker and
having a higher risk oflung cancer. Under those conditions, smoking could not
be a cause of lung cancer. However, the opposite ís not true: Simply showing
an association between smoking and cancer did not prove that smoking contributed to the risk of lung cancer. Additional rigorous evidence was needed,
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as is true with any area of scientific inquiry into causality. Along with showing
correlation, eviden~e of ca~sality requi.res evidence that the alleged causal agent
occurs prior to the condition it causes (e.g., that smoking precedes the development of cancers) and-the most difficult task-that other explanatíons are
discounted or accounted for.
"One ofthe first things they teach in introductory statistics is that correlation
is not causation," quipped Sowell (1996, p. 11) in The Country Chronicle. "lt
is also one ofthe first things forgotten." Remembering these rigorous standards
of causal proof and adopting the caution they impart constitute the third step in
systematic thinking.

Correlation and Causal Contlusions.

In everyday life we often jump
to conclusions about causality. Sometimes those judgments are based oi'L wbat
is, at best, incomplete or flimsy evidence of correlation, much of it anecdotal
and based on what we happen to have noticed or experienced. Unlike the
scientist, who relies on systematic sampling and statistical techniques, the
layperson "must rely upon intuitions and subjective impressions based on
limited access to ~elevant data," explained Ross and Anderson ( 1982, p. 140).
The result is often a biased base on which to build causal conclusions.
Sorne of those premature causal conclusions find their way, unexamined,
into the media, as illustrated by the story about the effects on survival if
passengers mentally map their emergency routes out of an aircraft. Sorne are
even embarrassing for the media. Take, for example, the media' s response to
infonnation proffered by various advocates for battered women including,
ironically, the group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (F AIR) that reports
of domestic violence rise 40o/o on Super Bowl Sunday. In short, the causal
implication is that watching the Super Bowl makes men more likely to batter
their female partners. As Hohler (1993) of The Boston Globe related:
The image was alarming. Men across Arnerica, incited by booze, gambling losses
and the body-slamrrUng explo1 ts of their football heroes, could make Super Bowl
Sunday the worst day of the year for domestic violence.
Activists trumpeted the warning, saying national studies supported their claim.
Much of the nation' s media echoed the alarm.
And NBC, heeding the prediction, aired as its only public service announcernent
in the countdown to the Super Bowl a 20-second televisíon spot that dramatized
for 40 mi Ilion viewers the horror of domestic violence.
But in an ernbarrassing setback forthe campaign against domestic violence---and
for the news media-sorne of the groups that pressured NBC to aír the free spot,
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including Faimess and Accuracy in Reporting, acknowledged yesterday thaÚhey
had based their predictions in part on incomplete, inaccurate or anecdotal
in formation. (p. 1)

According to Hohler, the media watchdog group F AIR had extrapolated the
40% figure, which F AIR described as anecdotal, from a book of photo essays
on domes tic violence. There were other errors in advocates' claims as wel.l, but
there did not seem to be any sign.ificant, systematic evidence of an increase in
domestic violence after the Super Bowl game .
"People are extraordinarily good atad boc explanation," Gilovich ( 1991, pp.
21-22) observed. "To live, it seems, is to explain, to justify, and to find
coherence among diverse outcomes, characteristics, and causes." Gilovich
noted that people can find parteros even in random phenomena-randomness
being the ultima te in uncertainty and lack of correlation-and quickly explain
the pattems in terms of their own preexisting theories and belíefs about
causality.
People can ha ve a number of intuitive, preexisting theories about causality
(see, e.g., Hilton, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Ma~y concem
human bebavior-the stuff that much reporting is rnade of. These intuitive
beliefs can bias our perceptions of causality, especia lly when causes and effects
are otherwise uncertain. For example, people tend to overestimate the role of
forces inside the individual, such as personality, ability, disposition, and motivation, as causes of human behavior and to underestimate the role of envirenmental or situational factors, such as the varied opportunities and obstacles that
exist for people in different social classes. Heider (1958) called this bias the
fundamental attribution error, and it affects us more when we interpret the
behavior of others, as reporters tend to do, rather than our own. When applied
to whole classes of people, the attribution ofbehavior to shared interna! states
can form the basis for socia] stereotypes (Hamilton, 1979), such as we might
ha ve of others of a different race or sex when we believe that whole groups of
people are ínherently lazy, ignorant, insensitive, and so forth. Media portrayals
migbt be associated with the ways audiences attribute to intemal or externa]
causes the way members of certain groups in society behave (Griffin & Sen,
1995). Attributional biases, of course, could have a 1ot of ram.ifications if they
influence media content, audíence perceptions, and social policy.
Although it would be nearly impossible for reporters to effectively counteract all sources of error when making statements about "why" and "so what,"
adopting a more rigorous set of standards for causal proof will reduce the
likelihood of inaccurate causal conclusions. To that end, here is a brief ovetview
of the other steps scientísts take in finding evídence of causality.
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The Right Time Slot.

People develop causal beliefs because they repeatedly witness ~e association between an event and something that follows
it (Hilton, 1988). Scientists use the same approach, although more rigorously.
In essence, a purported cause must be shown to precede its effect in real time,
whether it be epochs or nanoseconds. Many scientific procedures, such as most
controlled laboratory experiments or panel design surveys, directJy observe
before-and-after changes as they happen. In many other cases, such as in
geology or deep space astronomy, the evidence of before-and-after is often
gathered indírectly. Sometimes, attempts are tpade to discem causal sequences
from only one point in time, sucb as in a cross-sectional epidemiologícal or
public opinion survey. In all cases, however, it is wise to be cautious about the
evidence oftíme sequen ce. It is ofteil helpful for a reporter to determine whether
the proposed order of the cause and effect variables could just as realistically
'
be reversed.

The Network. Most of the things that happen are the result of a variety
of factors, many interwoven wíth one another. One of the most difficult tasks
in systematic th~ing and investigation is to separate the influence of an
apparent causal agent from other variables, often called confounds, which al so
might affect the outcome attributed to the causal agent.
Cohn ( 1989), for example, reJated the story of a scientist who proposed the
possibility that left-banded batters were overrepresented among the best hitters
in baseball because of hemispberic lateralization ofthe brain. A more baseballsavvy critic had a si.mpler explanation: Left-handed batters happen to enjoy a
natural physicaJ advantage in the game, specificaJJy, most pitchers are righthanded, which gives left-handed batters an edge, and left-handed batters are
already moving toward first base after they swing, making it easier for them to
reach the base.
Usually the simpler, more parsimonious explanation is preferred as long as
it predicts the phenomenon-in this case, the better hitting performance of
lefties in basebaJI-at Jeast as weJJ as the more complicated one. Of course, it
is al so quite possible that both the scientist and the baseball-wise observer were
right, because a phenomenon can (and usually does) have multiple causes.
Thus, it is wise for a reporter to ask wbat other causal agents might be on the
scene and how they have been accounted for.
Here are sorne of the other conunon pattems of relationships among causal
agents that a reporter might encounter. For convenience, the suspected causal
agent will be referred to by its common nickname, X, the variable it apparently
influences as Y, and the other dynamic variable in the míx as Z. X is also often
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referred to as an indepe11dent variable, Y as a dependen/ variable, and Z as a
thírd variable (no matter how many there are).

Contingency.

Sometimes a variable (Z) can work like a switch or catalyst for the relationship between X and Y. Only if Z takes on certain characteristics, for example, does X affect Y. In Fíg. 13.3, sex might be considered to
be Z, age as X, and 1i fetime cancer risk as Y .lf Z (sex) is female, then advancing
age (X) decreases overall cancer risk (Y). IfZ (sex) is mal e, then age and overall
cancer risk are unrelated.

lntervening Variable.

For a variable to effect change in another variable, the two must be functionally related. That is, the link between the variables
should be clear and the processes by which X affects Y well defined. Sometimes
X can affect Y only through an intervening variable Z that is the more proximate
cause of changes in Y. Thus, intervention is like a chain of relationships. For
example, researchers often look for, and find, differences in all sorts of social,
psychological, and even health-related variables based on demographic differences in the population. Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz ( 1994) found that white men
perceive risks differently than white women and minority men and women.
Yet, to explain why this difference occurs, the authors suggested that white
males may simply feel more in control oftheir environment than everyone else,
and that sense of control affects their perceptions ofbeing at risk. Thus, a sense
of control is posed as an intervening variable (Z). In general, demographic
variables often need su eh assistance. The alert reporter, trying to assess whether
the services of an intervening variable are needed, might ask wbether it is crystal
clear why X might affect Y. Take another look at Fig. 13.3 in that light.

Lurking Variable.

Thls one's a real con artist. In what is sometimes
called a spurious relationship, the lurk:ing variable Z deceives yo u into thínking
that X and Y are related when they really are not In reality, the lurkingvariable
itself affects both X and Y, mak:ing them correlate with one another without
any real connection between them. For example, suppose a study were to show
that Internet users who browse on-line news services know more about international c.urrent events than other Internet users. lt might indeed be tempting
to say that their greater use of net news (X) is mak.ing these folks more savvy
about what is happening in the world (Y). Might a Z be lurking about? Perhaps
these folk.s are better educated than those who do not use the on-line news
services. They might visit the on-line news sites as part of a partero of greater
attention to a lot of news channels, including television, newspapers, and news
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magazines. Their superior knowledge of international current events might be
a byproduct of their educational preparation coupled with their use of these
more tradítional news media. A good study will control for alternative possibilities such as this.
In general, the authors of most scientific studies are very cautious about
claíming causal relationships, preferring instead to claim not much more than
association. Nonetheless, systematic thin.king on the part of a journalist can
serve as a check on unwarranted causal claims.

SUMMARY:

PREPARI~G

FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

"So certain are yo u. "
-Y oda, Star Wars, Century uncerta1n

Computers, the Internet, and the other new cornmunication technologíes are
changing the informatíon landscape. Por joumalists and the public_ alike,
landmarks that used to identify trustworthy sources and valid infonnation are
disappearing. For example, rumors can attain about the same status as news on
the Internet, to the point that even veteran journalists have been befuddled.
Whether new landmarks appear in this world of uncertain information is
anyone's ·guess. If these trends continue, the new millennjum will require
people to have cognitive tools, or at least considerable guidance, to verify what
is va lid and what is not. More than ever, journalists will need to apply the tools
of systematic thinkíng, tools that, by their grounding in the sciences, are
effective in sorting out facts from fantasy, puffery, politics, and even the
preening of scientists.
F ortunatel y, there are many fme sources that joumalists can use to prepare
themselves. Philip Meyer's now classic works, Precision Journalism (1979)
and The New Precision Journa/ism (1991), continue to offer reporters superb
guidance in the use of surveys, sampling, statistics, and related tools of the
social sciences, and-just as valuable-guidance in the thinking that goes a long
with usíng them. Víctor Cohn ( 1989) sirnilarly provided an excellent guide to
reportíng a wide range of scientific controversies, methods, and thinking in
News & Numbers, a book that includes a fine chapter on scientific uncertainty.
Even though audiences might not generaHy be familiar with the role of
uncertaínty in science, clear reporting of uncertainty may indeed help people
understand it better (see Johnson & Slovic, 1995).
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Unfortunately, the mass media have provided critica_! observers with a
wealth of examples of how ~ot to report and display scientific and statisti_cal
information. Journalists can learn a lot about how.to do things better-~d
a lot about systematic thinking in the bargain-by read.ing books such as
Paulos' A Mathematici.an Reads the Newspaper ( 1995), bis best-seller Innumeracy: Mathematical fl/iteracy and its Consequences (1988), and Gilovich's
How We Know What Isn 't So (1991). Jouma1ists a1so shou1d take advant.age of
the movement within the teaching of statistics and mathematics that urges
universities to ensure that col1ege graduales are quantitatively literate, that is,
that they can apply mathematical thinking, beyond mere formulas, to everyday
problems (Subcommittee on Quantitative Literacy Requirements, 1995). Various universities are responding to this need by offering courses incorporating
or devoted to quantitative reasoning. The Chance Project at Dartrnouth College
in Hanover, New Hampshire, has a wealth of examples of correct and incorrect
quantitative reasoning in the news and also has a storehouse ofrelated teaching
materia1s, all available on-line (www.dartmouth.edu/-chance). One superb
how-to book that employs the systematic thinking approach to s~tistics and
that defmitely belongs on the joumalist's bookshelf is Jessica Utts' very
readable Seeing Through Stah'stics ( 1996).
The growth of computer-assisted reporting will require journalists to think
adeptly and systematically about the riumbers they encounter. ln fact, journalists without the requisite computer and quantitative sk.ills will probably fmd
themselves ata real disadvantage in the journalism job market (Feola, 1995).
The growth ofnew media, which overwhelmingly use visual displays to present
information, will demand that reporters and illustrators become masterful at
presenting quantitative information graphically and accurately. Computerized
animation and interactive formats could help audiences understand dynamíc
comparisons and even the influence of third variables. For example, one's
chances of contracting heart disease at a given age might be illustrated by a
curve on an attractive graph that changes as the viewer provides the computer
program wíth different information about his or her own unique background
and habits. The curve might be animated to show change based on lifesty1e
alterations, such as stopping smoking or adopting a low-fat diet, that the viewer
might be considering-and a range of uncertainty could be illustrated around
the curve. Of course, to date, media have sometimes dístorted quantitative
infonnation when presenting it graphically. Sorne fine books that show how to
prepare valid, attractive, still-life graphic displays of data include Utt's Seeing
Through Statistics ( 1996), Tufte 's Visual Explanations ( 1997), and especíally
Tankard's "Visual Crosstabs" (1994) and Wainer's Visual Revelations ( 1997).

learn
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Journalists in the 21st century must be able to reason from verbal and
quantitative infonnation, know how to assess what information is missing, be
able to gather and validate the required information, be adept at understanding
and explaining the uncertainty that scientific information inevitably contains,
and be able to interpret information to nonexpert audiences verbally, quantitatively, graphically and, most of all, accurately. These cognitive and communication skills are absolutely essential if joumalísts are to meet their
responsibilities to society and their audiences in the new millennium.
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